For Investors · McCall, Idaho
Airbnb turned millions of homes into listings. The stay itself never caught up.
An Idaho family-owned, hospitality-first company building the experience and data layer on top of short-term rentals — a curated rental brand, an AI concierge, and an owner platform — starting in McCall, our four-season lake-and-ski flagship roughly two hours from Boise. Curated stays. Concierge built into the code. Owner economics that finally work. You are invited to invest in the brand, software, and data company — not in real estate. AI in service of hospitality, never instead of it.
Where we are today, plainly: McCall Rentals is pre-portfolio, founder-led, and owner-operated. There is no managed book of homes yet and no outside traction to point to. Everything below keeps a bright line between what exists now — a founder-operated flagship — and what we plan to build. We intend to hold that line throughout diligence, and plan figures are labeled illustrative.
A. The opportunity
A big market built on broken hospitality.
Short-term rentals became one of travel’s largest categories — but it grew as a marketplace of supply, and the stay itself got left behind. Global STR gross bookings reached an estimated $183–202B in 2024, compounding at roughly 10–11% a year, and underneath that a $4.9B market for the software that runs these homes is forming. Yet the experience guests and owners actually pay for stays inconsistent and unscaled. Guests get listings, not stays. Owners get a faceless channel that keeps a large cut and owns the guest relationship outright. The value over the next decade accrues to whoever owns the experience and the data, not the raw listings. We intend to be a host first and a software company second.
A. The opportunity · the problem
Everyone in this market gets a worse deal than they should.
Three failures share one root cause: full-service hospitality has always been people-heavy, so quality and scale pull against each other.
- Guests get transactions, not stays. Communication is one of the biggest drivers of reviews — yet the typical host replies in hours, not minutes, and a slow or absent answer quietly becomes a bad review.
- Owners get two bad options. Hand the keys to an OTA that keeps a large cut and owns the guest forever, or hire a national manager that scales itself into the ground.
- Managers can’t scale quality. Adding doors means adding people, and adding people breaks both the experience and the margin. Growth and standards have always fought each other.
A. The opportunity · the vacuum at the top
The category lost its leaders — and stranded their owners.
This isn’t a thesis about a future failure; the top of the market just emptied out. Vacasa fell from a $4.5B valuation to a ~$47M sale in 2025, and Sonder filed Chapter 7 in November 2025. They didn’t lose because demand fell — demand is rising. They lost because the people-heavy, capital-heavy way they chased scale was never built to hold quality: add doors and you break quality and margin at once. Their collapse left premium homes, and the guests who love them, without a serious operator. The lesson sits at the center of our plan — scale quality with software, not headcount or leases, and earn density before reaching for sprawl.
A. The opportunity · why now
Four curves are converging at once.
Timing is the whole argument. None of these on its own opens the door — together they do.
- An AI inflection — guest communication, among the highest-value workflows in hospitality, is now also the most automatable, for the first time at a human standard rather than a chatbot one.
- A vacuum at the top — Vacasa sold for a fraction of peak and Sonder filed Chapter 7 in November 2025; the leaders are gone and their owners are looking for someone serious.
- Demand shifting toward vacation rentals as travelers choose homes over hotel rooms.
- An Idaho tailwind — McCall sits in the 2nd-fastest-growing US state, roughly two hours from Boise, a premium mountain market on a clear upswing.
A. The opportunity · the beachhead
McCall: a supply-constrained premium market, priced early.
Our proof-of-concept beachhead is a four-season lake-and-ski town on Payette Lake, roughly two hours from Boise. McCall’s current ADR sits well below comparable Mountain-West resort towns — we read that gap as latent premium, not a ceiling, and as the upside we intend to close with better hospitality and pricing. Operators are putting real capital behind the destination — $35M into Brundage and $245M into Tamarack — against genuine shoreline and terrain scarcity that can’t be manufactured. We prove the model here first, then carry the same playbook into the next markets.
B. The unique value
One company, three parts that reinforce each other.
We are building a hospitality company that operates software-first — not a software product looking for hospitality. It comes together in three parts, each in service of the guest and the owner: the marketplace produces the guest relationships and review history, the AI turns communication into ratings and data, and the owner platform delivers full-service operations at software margins.
- A curated premium marketplace — hand-vetted homes, booking by application, a brand built for guests who’d otherwise reserve Auberge or Four Seasons. We own the guest relationship rather than renting it back from an OTA.
- An AI concierge and satisfaction loop — fast, attentive responses and real-time sentiment that catches a problem before it becomes a review, trained to replicate a documented human standard of care.
- An owner platform — transparent economics, dynamic pricing, and full-service operations delivered at software margins instead of headcount-heavy management.
B. The unique value · the moat is the loop
The moat is the loop.
The defensibility isn’t a single feature — it’s a loop that compounds with every stay. Great communication earns higher ratings and Guest-Favorite status; that lifts bookings and rates; every stay produces proprietary satisfaction data; that data trains a better AI; and the better AI makes communication faster and more attentive still. A new entrant can copy any single piece. The loop — and the data only we accumulate by running real stays — is what they can’t.
B. The unique value · why us
Founder–market fit on both sides of the product.
This works because of who is building it. One founder is a hospitality operator — an Airbnb Superhost with decades in hospitality, and the human benchmark of care the AI is trained to replicate. The other is a developer-operator who was core to a prior successful venture exit and owns the product and its distribution. The pairing is the point: someone who knows what a great stay feels like, and someone who can encode it in software. Both backgrounds, including the prior exit, are documented and evidenced in the data room on request — provided for verification, not asserted as proof here.
- Hospitality founder — Airbnb Superhost; decades in hospitality; the standard of care the AI replicates
- Platform founder — developer-operator, core to a prior successful venture exit; owns product and distribution
- Idaho family-owned, owner-operated, and locally based — not a remote-managed arbitrage play
B. The unique value · today vs. plan
What exists now, and what we intend to build.
Where we are right now
Today we operate as the founding portfolio in our flagship McCall market — owner-operated, hands-on, curated rather than transactional. There are no doors under third-party management yet, and stays are booked by application so we can earn the early review history and operational data that the platform is trained on. The proof-of-concept comes before the scale.
- Pre-portfolio at the company level; founder-led, owner-operated
- Founding portfolio in McCall — Payette Lake, Brundage, Tamarack
- Curated stays, booking by application — not yet a third-party management book
- No outside traction asserted; seed funds the first doors plus the AI concierge MVP
What we plan to build (illustrative)
From the flagship, the plan is to ship the proprietary AI concierge and satisfaction loop, bring on managed owners, expand into additional premium resort markets, and add SaaS licensing in Year 3 and beyond — licensing the platform to other premium managers. These are illustrative planning figures, not guarantees, and even they assume a small share of a very large market.
- Ship the AI concierge and guest-satisfaction loop
- Bring on managed owners; expand into additional premium markets
- Add SaaS licensing in Year 3 and beyond
- Year-5 plan stays under 0.1% of US professionally-managed supply (illustrative)
C. The nature of the investment
What you’re investing in: the software-first OpCo — not real estate.
Make this unmistakable. You are buying into OpCo: the brand, the software, and the data — that is what your equity owns. You are not buying homes. The homes are financed separately through debt and an SPV (PropCo), which keeps the equity company capital-light and keeps real-estate assets off the cap table. Two cash engines feed OpCo: full-service management today, at roughly a 30% take-rate on gross bookings — premium full-service from day one — and SaaS licensing in Year 3 and beyond, the satisfaction-loop platform licensed to other premium managers. Mixing assets into the equity would suppress the multiple; keeping them apart is the whole point.
- OpCo holds the brand, software, and data — that is the equity you are buying
- PropCo / SPV finances the homes separately through debt — not your exposure, and the company stays capital-light
- Management take-rate is roughly 30% of gross bookings, premium full-service from day one
- SaaS licensing engine begins in Year 3 and beyond
C. The nature of the investment · how it’s valued
Built software-first, so it’s valued software-first.
This is the crux of the return. Because the equity company is built and run as software, it is valued on software multiples — roughly 8–15× revenue — not on real-estate book value or the thin 0.5–2× multiples that pure management operators carry. That gap is the difference between a Guesty (~$900M) or a Hostaway (~$1B) on one side and a faded national manager on the other. Keeping homes out of the cap table is deliberate. The plan points to a strategic outcome of $50–200M+ in years five to seven, with likely acquirers across travel platforms, STR software, and hospitality groups — illustrative outcomes, not promises, and even there the Year-5 capture stays under 0.1% of US professionally-managed supply.
C. The nature of the investment · the round
A $2.5M Seed to build the founding portfolio and the platform.
We are raising a $2.5M Seed on a post-money SAFE at a ~$12M cap, open to accredited investors with a $100K minimum. The capital funds the AI concierge and satisfaction loop plus the first doors that turn the flagship market into a repeatable model — equity in the software-first company, not in the homes.
The full deck, terms, financial model, year-by-year projections, founder documentation, and bottoms-up underwriting are confidential and available in the data room on request — delivered to accredited investors after an introductory call. We screen for background and capacity before sharing, which keeps the process private for everyone.
For discussion with accredited investors only. This is not an offer to sell or a solicitation to buy securities. Market figures are third-party estimates; financial projections are illustrative and not guarantees of performance.